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RECENT DECISIONS
the reservation of title within ten days after the seller learns of the
removal, or else such reservation is void as against "any purchaser
from or creditor of the buyer, who, without notice of such provision,
purchases the goods or acquires by attachment or levy a lien upon
them.. . ." (italics added). 23 It seems clear therefore that as against
one who does have actual notice prior to the purchase or attachment,
the refiling of the contract is not necessary. If, on the other hand,
actual notice is received after the attachment or purchase, then re-
filing within ten days is essential to preserve the seller's security
interest. 24 To hold otherwise, as in the Frontier Motors case, that
actual or personal notice is sufficient, ignores the clear distinction con-
tained in section 5 between creditors and purchasers who have notice
before the purchase or attachment, and those who do not. It is also
important to note that a conditional vendor has a decided advantage
even in the case where the creditor or purchaser did not have notice
when he made the attachment or the purchase. Section 14 gives the
seller ten days after he first learns of the removal in which merely
by filing the reservation of title, he may secure a priority over the
innocent creditor or purchaser. Thus, bearing in mind that the Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act purports to protect the bona fide purchaser
and others from secret liens and hidden claims,25 it seems essential
to limit the means available to the conditional vendor to retain his
superior security interest as against purchasers or creditors who did
not have notice when they acted, by strictly construing the statute
to require filing or recording of the seller's reservation of title.
RIcnrmw J. AsH
Admissibility of Patients' Statement of Past Pain and Suffering
Made to a Physician for the Purpose of Securing Treatment-
Plaintiff brought an action for personal injuries arising out of an
intersection collision. Prior to any contemplated suit, plaintiff sought
and received the professional services of a physician. The trial court
provision in a conditional sale reserving property in the seller shall be void as
to any purchaser from or creditor of the buyer, who, without notice of
such provision, purchases the goods or acquires by attachment or levy a lien
upon them, before the contract or a copy thereof shall be filed as hereinafter
provided, unless such contract or copy is so filed within ten days after the mak-
ing of the conditional sale.
23 Ibid.
24 An interesting issue is raised in the case where the seller does prevail under
section 14 and seeks damages instead of recovery of possession. Although the
issue is an important one as far as the parties go, few courts have discussed
the problem. In the Frontier Motors case, however, the court pointed out that
the correct measure of damages is that the vendor is entitled to recover the
amount of his special interest, i.e., the unpaid balance under the contract plus
incidental expenses, or the value of the chattel at the time of trial, whichever
of the two is the lesser amount.2 5Supra, note 19.
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excluded testimony offered on the part of the plaintiff's medical expert
relating to past events and past history. Held: Affirmed.
A recitation of past events or past history even by an attend-
ing physician testifying as an expert, constitutes hearsay and is
without function. . . . Mere descriptive statements of a sick
or injured person as to symptoms and effects of his injury or
malady are only admissible when they have been made to a
medical attendant for the purpose of medical treatment. They
must, however, relate to existing pain or other symptoms from
which the patient is suffering at the time and they must not
relate to past transactions or symptoms, however closely these
may be related to the present sickness or the present suffering
from the injury. Berg v. Ullevig, 70 N.W. 2d 133 (Minn. 1955).
The court in the principal case has followed the majority rule in
prohibiting a medical expert to testify concerning a patient's statement
of past pain and suffering where the patient's purpose in securing
the physician's services was for treatment'. A brief discussion of the
problems with reference to statements made by patients to lay persons
and physicians regarding present and past pains or other symptoms
is necessary for a true understanding of the admissibility or non-
admissibility of such statements.
The rules governing the reception of evidence of this nature given
by lay persons were clearly stated by the late Justice Winslow of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in an early Wisconsin case :2
All persons may testify as to facts within their observation as
to the physical condition of another with whom they have con-
sorted; for example whether such person appeared to be in good
or bad health,, sick or well, suffering from pain or disease or
enjoying health....
When bodily pain is in issue all persons may testify as to ex-
pressions, gestures or exclamations indicating present pain,
whether made at the time of the injury or afterwards....
Witnesses are not permitted to testify to complaints or state-
ments of physical condition or feelings made by an injured
person which were made in answer to a question, or which are
narrative in their nature, and which are not part of the res
gestae.
When the court refers to "witnesses" in the last sentence, it may
be assumed that it refers to lay persons only and not to physicians.
To enable a lay person to testify concerning statements made by an
injured party, such statements must be classified under the res gestae
exception to the hearsay rule as "spontaneous manifestations of dis-
tress." In other words the expression of pain on behalf of the injured
party must be spontaneous and not in narrative form or in answer to a
question.
'Numerous cases will be found in 64 A.L.R. 557.
2 Keller v. Gilman, 93 Wis. 9, 66 N.W. 800 (1896).
[Vol. 39
RECENT DECISIONS
Statements made to a physician not for the purpose of treatment
or advice, but for the purpose of qualifying him as a witness for trial
when suit is either contemplated or begun are universally held inad-
missible.3 The reasons for excluding such statements are obvious. With
a contemplated suit in mind, the trustworthiness of any statement
which a party might make to his physician is immediately put in
question.
It is obvious that a patient's statements to his physician cannot
serve a dual purpose, i.e., the purpose of treatment and at the same
time to qualify the physician as an expert. Our Supreme Court held
that statements of the patient to his physician are admissible only when
they are made for the sole purpose of obtaining treatment before
litigation was begun or threatened.4
Statements made by a patient to his physician for the sole purpose
of obtaining treatment and advice concerning his present pain and
sufferings are universally held to be admissible.5 The courts hold that
such statements of pain and suffering are regarded as spontaneous,
free from all motives to misrepresent and that consequently the danger
of insincerity is slight. Such statements are not made with any self-
serving purpose. There is every reason to believe that they are true,
because it would be absurd for a patient to make false statements
to a physician who is to treat the ailment and who must base his treat-
ment in part on such statements.
The question of the admissibility of a patient's statements made to
his physician for the sole purpose of treatment concerning past pain
and suffering has left the courts in much discord. The principal case
follows the majority rule in rejecting such evidence. 6 The principal
case and a majority of the courts draw a distinction between declara-
tions expressive of existing pain or suffering and mere narrative state-
ments of past pain and suffering. The former are regarded as "spon-
taneous manifestations of distress" while the latter are regarded
merely as heresay and consequently not admissible.
Reason, however, leads us to the conclusion that the distinction in
the rules which rejects the admission of statements made by a patient
to his physician as to past pain and suffering and allows statements
made by such patient to his physician as to his present pain and suffer-
ing should be abolished. Professor Edmund M. Morgan, a leading
3 Cases collected in 67 A.L.R. 10, 15-18 (1930) ; 80 Id. 1527 (1932) ; 130 Id. 977
(1941). 1 WMoE, EVIDENCE, p. 2250, §1747; 20 Am. Jur. p. 530, §625; 2
JONES, EVIDENCE, p. 2233, §1217.
4 Kath v. Wisconsin Central RR. Co., 121 Wis. 503, 99 N.W. 217.
5 Northern Pac. RR. Co. v. Urlin, 158 U.S. 271, 15 S.Ct. 840, 39 L. Ed. 977
(1895); Yellow Cab Co. v. Henderson, 183 Md. 546, 39 A.2d 546 (1944);
Munden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 213 N.C. 504, 196 S.E. 872, (1938); 6
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §1714.6 Supra, notes 1 and 5; McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, §265, §266 (1954).
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authority on the law of Evidence in his recent publication Basic
Problems of Evidence makes the following comment :7
Declarations of Past Pain and Other Symptoms. A patient
who consults a physician or surgeon for treatment has every
reason for answering truly all pertinent questions put to him
concerning his past symptoms both subjective and objective.
And generally speaking no medical attendant will treat or per-
scribe for a patient without hearing and considering the history
of his condition. For the reasons a few courts have wisely held
admissible declarations as to past pain and other mental or
bodily condition when made to a medical attendant for the
purpose of securing medical treatment.
Courts which admit testimony of present as well as of past symp-
toms hold that a person consulting a physician for treatment has no
motive to falsify statements whether they concern his present or past
ailments.8 In an early Massachusetts case the court uses the following
language :9
While a witness, not an expert, can testify only to such exclama-
tions and complaints as indicate present existing pain and suffer-
ing, a physician may testify to a statement or narrative given
by his patient in relation to his condition, symptoms, sensations
and feelings, both past and present. In both cases, because in
this way only can the bodily condition of the party, who is the
subject of the injury, and who seeks to obtain damages, be
ascertained.
Leading authorities on this subject seem to be in accord with the
minority rule? 0
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin follows the minority rule and
permits the admission of both present and past symptoms when related
to a physician by a patient solely for the purpose of securing medical
treatment. This rule was stated by the late Justice Winslow briefly
as follows :2
The statements and declarations of a patient as to his pains and
feelings, when made to a physician for the purpose of treatment,
may be given in evidence.
In a recent Wisconsin case our Supreme Court followed the rule
above stated. 12 In this case it appears that a Mrs. Johnson was injured
at her place of employment. She testified that immediately after the
7 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE, Vol. II, p. 287 (1954).
8 Meany v. United States, 112 F.2d 538, 130 A.L.R. 973 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Kraettli
v. North Coast Transportation Co., 166 Wash. 186, 6 P.2d 609, 80 A.L.R. 1520
(1932).
9 Rossa v. Boston Loan Co., 132 Mass. 439 (1882).
10 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, §266 (1954) ; Supra, note 7.
22 Supra, note 2.
12 Brouwer v. Industrial Comm., 266 Wis. 73, 62 N.W.2d 577 (1953).
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accident she became nauseated. Dr. Dundon was called as an expert
by the plaintiff. "He testifies as to subjective symptoms which he had
found and as to the effect that she had told him at his first examination
'there was no unconsciousness right after the injury, but nausea,
vomiting, and headaches, and three days later dizziness' . . ." Mrs.
Johnson was injured on Aug. 10, 1949 and Dr. Dundon saw her for
the first time on July 20, 1950. On page 79 of the opinion we find
the following language:
Mrs. Johnson testified that she became nauseated; she did not
testify she had vomited. Dr. Dundon testified that when he first
examined her she told him that she had suffered 'nausea, vomit-
ing, and headaches.' The statement was made by her for the
purpose of treatment and was properly received in evidence.
(cases cited.)
It is reasonable to assume that the same trustworthiness which
exists when the physician testifies as to present symptoms exists as
to past symptoms. Why should the patient attempt to deceive the
physician in the first instance, and not in the last instance. For a
physician to treat a patient without first questioning him concerning
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